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these directions. If this view is correct, then the New York City experience sheds considerable light on four topics important to social scientists, public administrators, and political leaders in other urban areas: the processes of urban decline and transformation; patterns of public sector resource allocation or budgeting; the nature of public management; and the relationship between the availability of resources and the level of public services.
Urban Decline and New York City
The recent history of New York City contradicts some urban development theories. One of the most pessimistic urbanologists, George Sternlieb, argues that large American cities will continue to decline in size and importance because manufacturing, their initial economic base, has largely decentralized, and because services, which replaced manufacturing in many cities, are undergoing a similar process as computer and communications technologies reduce the locational advantages of central cities. In Sternlieb's words:
Central city economic decline is not a mere accompaniment of general national job lethargy but rather at least in major part is independent of it. The plans for redress whether of the right or the left face an enormously potent degenerative inertia which will not be easily corrected. 2 Economic forces undeniably are powerful, working to shape and reshape America's metropolitan areas. But the economic incentives for geographic dispersal do not make urban decline immutable or universal. Anthony Downs and his colleagues at The Brookings Institution found that one-third of American cities with 1970 populations over 100,000 are growing, and they concluded that the causes of urban change are multiple, including the basic economic trends identified by Sternlieb as well as other factors, like tax rates, that are subject to local influence. 3 In the Brookings scholars' words:
The adverse situations in which many cities find themselves are not solely the result of their incompetence or of "natural" market forces working themselves out. Rather, these situations are strongly molded by political institutions, legal regulations, social prejudices, and market imperfections. 4 While recognizing the potency of economic forces, their analysis suggests that public policy can play a role in counteracting the forces of urban decline.
New York City provides an example of both rapid urban decline and the potential for local public policy to help reverse this trend. The decline in New York was dramatic (see Table 1 ). Between 1969 and 1977, the city lost over 600,000 jobs, nearly one-sixth of its employment base, and its population fell by more than onetenth or nearly one million people in the 1970s. The scale of this decline is unprecedented. Consider that the number of jobs lost in New York City was the equivalent of total employment in San Diego, and that its population loss was equivalent to one of the nation's ten largest cities disappearing.
Beginning in 1977, however, the local economy began to recover, though slowly, and job gains were posted each year through 1982. The causes of this reversal have not been fully sorted out, but the national business cycle does not provide the sole explanation because the city outpaced the nation in the rate of employment growth during parts of the post-1977 period. New York City's unique position in the international economy certainly contributed to its growth, but so apparently did changes in local policies. During the last half of the 1970s, municipal officials refrained from passing new tax measures, lowered rates on selected business taxes, and froze the property tax rate.5 When access to capital 
Retrenchment and Resource Allocation
For most of the post-World War II period, governments at all levels expanded. Thus social scientists concerned with resource allocation in the public sector had few opportunities to study budgeting during retrenchment. The literature described a relatively consistent pattern of budgetary behavior. As resources expanded, they tended to be distributed in an incremental pattern. Current-year agency expenditures were recognized as a "base," budget decisions focused on the size of the increment to this base, and little variation occurred in the mix of public spending over time. 7 The prevailing pattern of incremental budgeting led many observers to believe that public budgets would shrink in decremental fashion during retrenchment. The evidence testing this hypothesis is inconclusive in places other than New York City. Studies of California's initial experience under the revenue limitations imposed by Proposition 13 are of limited applicability because of the large state surplus initially available to offset local income losses.8 Only in the most recent year or two have California's localities been forced to cope with significant cutbacks, and their responses have not been systematically studied. Evidence from the first year of retrenchment in Massachusetts localities under Proposition 21/2 suggests widely differing resource allocation patterns among types of localities, but firmer conclusions will require a longer period over which to assess the impacts. 9 In contrast, available evidence from New York City provides an in-depth, multi-year basis for examining budgetary responses to retrenchment. Table 2 New York City's distinctive features strengthen rather than weaken the insights it provides to other urban areas.
During the fiscal crisis, redistributive functions were accorded the highest priority; their spending increased nearly 14 percent or more than three times as fast as all spending exclusive of debt service. Developmental functions were assigned the lowest priority; their spending was cut more than one-third. Allocative functions received a slightly increased share of funds; their spending increased by nearly 8 percent compared to the 4.5 percent gain for all spending exclusive of debt service.
During the recovery period of 1978-82, municipal priorities were altered significantly. Developmental functions went from least-favored to most-favored status; their expenditure increase totaled 72 percent compared to the overall spending (exclusive of debt service) rise of 33 percent. Redistributive functions were downgraded to the lowest priority; their spending grew 21 percent or about two-thirds the overall rate. Allocative functions continued to receive a slowly growing share of city services; their spending increased 36 percent.
These data contradict the incremental view that expenditure changes, whether increases or decreases, tend to be made "across the board" with all units experiencing roughly proportional increments or decrements. The analysis also contradicts a second model of budgeting emphasizing the "uncontrollable" nature of public spending. According to this view, shifts in local priorities occur because of uncontrollable commitments rather than the deliberate exercise of judgment by local officials." Uncontrollable commitments are defined as those which budget-makers cannot alter in a given year without statutory or contractual changes. At the local level, the major "uncontrollable" items are debt service, contracts, and legal mandates imposed by higher levels of government.
Such commitments exist for the City of New York. Studies have shown that uncontrollable spending, by this definition, comprises roughly two-thirds of the total expense budget, and that this figure has been relatively stable in recent years.'2 The major uncontrollable items in the city budget (other than debt service) have been identified as state-mandated spending for public assistance and Medicaid, court-ordered spending for corrections, and state requirements that a constant share of the expense budget be allocated to elementary and secondary education.
However, the existence of these legal obligations does not mean that they control the city's spending priorities. First, when a perspective longer than one year is taken, most items become "controllable." Laws can be changed and contracts renegotiated to alter long-term commitments. Examples include local actions involving the renegotiation of collective bargaining contracts, restructuring of outstanding debt, and passage of state laws that relieved the city of previously mandated court and higher education expenses. Second, legal constraints do not necessarily determine spending patterns. In the case of welfare and Medicaid, for example, spending growth was curbed and their priority lowered despite state mandates. Education mandates are not determinative because the city consistently has spent more on this function than state law dictates. Only in the case of corrections can it be argued that legal mandates, in this case federal court orders that set standards for prisoners' living conditions, pushed spending beyond the level which local officials might otherwise have desired-up 88 percent from $126 million in 1975 to $237 million in 1982. However, the city could have altered the spending required by this mandate by lowering the prison population through shorter sentences or alternatives to incarceration.
If neither mandates nor incrementalism has driven municipal spending priorities, what has? An explanation consistent with the outcomes summarized in Table  2 involves four discretionary decisions. The first is the decision to link capital spending to the availability of borrowed capital. When the fiscal crisis drove the city out of public credit markets, it reduced capital spending rather than divert current revenues for capital purposes. Since agencies differ markedly in their mix of capital and labor inputs, this decision affected some agencies more significantly than others. When the city successfully sought federal loan guarantees to expand its capital budget in the 1978-82 period, those agencies with disproportionately large capital requirements benefited most.
A second set of discretionary decisions limited growth in spending for redistributive programs, particularly during the 1978-82 period. These decisions were reached and implemented by state officials who control the public assistance and Medicaid programs, but within New York City there were few influential advocates for increased redistribution. The state froze welfare grant levels and implemented a strict hospital cost-containment program, and health care spending under the city's control also was curbed. The major exception to this policy of limiting redistributive commitments was unforeseen growth in the city's Medicaid-funded home Finally, the budget outcomes reflect a discretionary decision to favor elementary and secondary education over many other services. In each period, total spending for education grew more rapidly than the budget (net of debt service) as a whole. While some of this increment was required to provide special services to handicapped students, the combined result of more funds and fewer students was an enriched educational program.
In sum, recent budget outcomes are not attributable primarily to either the imperatives of the past or the dictates of other governments. Public officials decided to tie capital spending to the availability of long-term borrowing, thereby causing developmental priorities to fall and subsequently to rise along with the city's access to capital markets; to curb the city's redistributive functions; to transfer certain functions to the state; and to increase disproportionately spending for elementary and secondary education. The point is not that these were "good" or "bad" outcomes, but that they resulted from the choices of public officials responsible for setting municipal priorities.
Retrenchment and Municipal Management
When the City of New York's fiscal crisis made headlines in 1975, its municipal government seemed a caricature of the "ill-managed public sector." Such indictments of municipal management were credible because they were partly true, but the charges also squared with the widely-held notion that the American private and public sectors differ in many respects, including the quality of their management. According to this view, firms are better managed than municipalities because the former operate in a competitive market while the latter operate as monopolies without "bottom-line" concerns that encourage managerial efficiency. This interpretation of management behavior is popular within the academic community. For example, Wallace Sayre, one of New York City government's most influential students, considered the nature of public and private management earlier than most and concluded that they were "fundamentally alike in all unimportant respects. " 13 New York City provides an example of both rapid urban decline and the potential for local public policy to help reverse this trend.
In addition to the invidious corhparisons emanating from the importance attached to distinctions between the public and private sectors, management theory includes another postulate that indicated New York City's serious problems would worsen as a result of fiscal stress. Most organizational theorists posit that "slack" resources are essential to managerial innovation. In their classic study, Richard Cyert and James March defined slack resources as "payments to members of the organization in excess of what is required to maintain the organization."'" Managers with more resources than are minimally necessary for organizational survival were viewed as able to "buy off" opposition to change. In the words of Charles Levine, a leading student of "cutback management," ... without slack resources to produce "win-win" consensus-building solutions and to provide side payments to overcome resistance to change, organizations will have difficulty innovating and maintaining flexibility. 5 These assumptions about the weak character of public sector management and about the adverse consequences of fiscal stress led many social scientists to question the ability of municipal managers to initiate improvements and thus to blunt the effects of retrenchment. Yet, the ability of municipal leaders to deal with their problems in ways thought unique to the private sector and under conditions of fiscal stress is evident throughout New York City's recovery. Notable changes include the rationalization of budgetary practices, the achievement of greater efficiency in service delivery, the modification of collective bargaining policies to reduce real labor costs, and the establishment of a long-range planning process involving multi-year financial plans and capital needs assessments.
The shift in budgetary practices from an incremental pattern to one of clearer priority setting among functions has been noted already. Almost equally important were budgetary adjustments reflecting altered priorities within agencies. For example, the New York Police Department dismantled certain smaller units such as that dealing with community affairs.'6 Additional significant departmental policy changes were implemented without formal organizational shifts. A smaller police force was deployed so as to increase felony arrests and reduce arrests for less serious crimes. Specifically, while total arrests fell one-fifth between 1975 and 1979, the number of felony arrests increased 11 percent and arrests for misdemeanors and violations dropped 27 percent and 75 percent, respectively.'7 In the Sanitation Department, workers were reassigned from street cleaning to refuse collection. Between 1975 and 1980, the average daily number of employees assigned to street cleaning declined 69 percent, from 1,542 to 475; the respective figure for refuse collection were 3,353 and 3,126 for a decline of just 7 percent.'8 These changes reflected clear choices to favor one service over another rather than to muddle through in decremental fashion.
The city also delivered services more efficiently, in part by substituting capital for labor via new technology. The introduction of larger, side-loading sanitation trucks that could be manned by two workers rather than three is the most striking example of this traditional form of "good management." In the Fire Department, expanded use of new alarm systems requiring voice responses significantly reduced the waste of firefighters in responding to false alarms. Largely due to this innovation, the number of responses to false alarms dropped 37 percent, from over 281,000 to approximately 176,000 between 1978 and 1981. 19 The city's labor relations policies and practices were altered during the recovery in order to lower operating costs. Political leaders shifted from being notoriously "soft" bargainers who traded compensation for electoral support from unionized employees to being "hard" bargainers. As shown in Table 3, between 1970 and 1975 all categories of city workers enjoyed gains in their real or constant dollar earnings with the increases for patrolmen reaching 32 percent and teachers as much as 45 percent. In contrast, the 1975-80 period brought constant dollar reductions in pay for municipal workers with the loss as great as 16 percent for patrolmen. These reversals resulted directly from negotiations in which municipal officials bargained toughly for small pay increases in order to help eliminate budget deficits and minimize necessary workforce reductions.
Finally, the city improved its information systems and integrated them into a financial planning process with a long-term perspective. The city that literally did not know how many people it employed in 1975 now projects staffing levels, borrowing, and cash flow for fouryear period, and it has a 10-year plan for capital investments. The system still has shortcomings, but its level of detail and frequent modifications make it a model among the public and private sectors. 20 
Retrenchment and Municipal Services
Undoubtedly, the most widely shared concern about retrenchment is its effect on public services. Most citizens, public employees, political leaders, and social scientists feared that reduced budgets inevitably would mean fewer and poorer quality services. One respected observer, Edward K. Hamilton, foresaw "general service default" as the likely outcome of municipal fiscal stress.2'
The New York City experience suggests that in many instances these fears were justified. In the years after the fiscal crisis, most municipal agencies provided a reduced volume of services and in many cases the services also were of poorer quality. For example, as noted earlier, between 1975 and 1979 the number of arrests made by the police fell over 19 percent, from 245,125 to 197,805; and the share of the city's streets rated acceptably clean by a monitoring program dropped from 72 to 55 percent. 22 But agencies in New York City provide significant exceptions to the presumed link between money and services. Some services actually improved after the fiscal crisis; others declined only slightly despite substantial reductions in agency budgets and staff; in some functions, spending rose but services declined. The most striking example is mass transit. Between 1978 and 1981, transit authority expenditures increased over 7 percent in constant dollars, and the number of employees rose nearly 5 percent. But added resources yielded no service improvement as ridership fell 2.1 percent, on-time performance fell from 96 to 90 percent, and virtually all other measures of service quality also declined. 23 In contrast, the sanitation department improved refuse collection with fewer resources. Between 1978 and 1981, the unit's operating budget was cut more than one-fifth in constant dollars. However, no reduction occurred in the scheduled frequency of refuse collections, and the percentage of scheduled collections not performed dropped from 8.4 to 2.6 percent. 24 A final noteworthy exception is the fire department. During the 1978-81 period, its constant dollar budget fell nearly 6 percent, but average response times to fire alarms were shortened, indicating improved service.25
Thus another important lesson from New York City's experience with retrenchment is that the link between fiscal resources and service levels is more complex than popular perceptions suggest. One intervening variable in the relationship between money and services is the innovative management behavior discussed above. Organizational innovation stimulated by the disappearance of slack resources helped some services to be maintained and others not to be substantially reduced.
Consumer behavior is another important complication in the link between resources and services. With any given budget allocation, any agency's managers presumably can serve better a smaller rather than a larger number of consumers. The sizable population loss in New York City thus indirectly helped improve services for those who remained. In education, for example, enrollment declines outpaced budget cuts in several years, permitting improvement in pupil-teacher ratios and eventual gains in average reading and mathematics test scores. Similarly, the ability of fewer fire companies to respond to fires more rapidly is explained largely by the decreased number of fires with population loss and the near desertion of portions of the city.
More than their numbers is important in considering the role of consumers in helping to determine service levels. Michael Lipsky's research on "street level" bureaucrats showed the importance of front-line service deliverers in determining the content of public services.26 But the discretionary behavior of citizen- consumers at the point of service delivery also is important. Providing public services often involves a dynamic interaction between the civil servants who "produce" the services and the citizens who "consume" them. In fact, the concept of "coproduction" characterizes municipal service delivery better than public production.27 Part of the explanation for the imperfect link between spending and services in New York City involves changes in consumer behavior. Examples include the declining number of false alarms and the drop in the amount of refuse to be collected. Because consumer behavior is an important determinant of service levels, public policy should be concerned with modifying this behavior. In fact, the significance of the consumers' role has received growing recognition among municipal officials in recent years. They now engage in explicit programs to alter citizen demand for services through a combination of educational efforts (that are called marketing in the private sector), regulation, and pricing. familiar: changes in the economic base of cities leave them with financial resources inadequate to meet their public service needs; their local governments lack the capacity to change; public services decline, contributing to further employment and population losses.
The evidence from New York City suggests that urban development is a more dynamic process than prevailing theories recognize. A generation ago, when fiscal crises were unheard of, a pathbreaker in the field of urban economics, Wilbur Thompson, observed that urban development follows a path similar to Toynbee's theme of challenge and response. He suggested that as long as two decades may be required to span the period in which urban decline begins and accelerates, local leadership recognizes the problem and makes adjustments, and the new economic realities are reflected in a resurgence of growth. 28 We hope the past decade of New York City's history fits into this cycle, and that the experience is useful to others facing similar challenges.
Notes

Conclusion
It is easy to be pessimistic about the future of American cities. Widespread evidence of their problems exists: Most are losing people and jobs; they often have fewer resources with which to meet growing human service needs; and the quality of their political leadership and professional administrators frequently falls short of desired standards. Prevailing frameworks of social science inquiry reinforce this pessimism. Cities are studied from vantages that emphasize the immutability of the economic forces causing decline, the inability of elected officials to control the allocation and improve the management of public resources, and the dependence of improved public services on increased public expenditures. The corresponding logic of urban decline is simple and 
